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RIGHT TO COUNSEL

initiates further communication with police. 10 15 In contrast, New
York has instituted a per se rule based on its own state constitution which forbids further questioning and elicitation of voluntary waiver of the right to counsel in the absence of counsel.
Therefore, an individual cannot freely choose to waive the right
to counsel without his or her attorney's presence subsequent to an
earlier request or retention of counsel.
Bartolomeo further expanded such protection by imputing a request or retention of counsel with respect to an earlier pending
charge to a subsequent arrest on an unrelated charge. As a result,
although the Bing decision has negated this recent expansion,
New York continues to provide greater protection for the uncharged individual subject to custodial interrogation in the context
of a single arrest.
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
SECOND DEPARTMENT
10 16
People v. Margan

(decided April 23, 1990)

A criminal defendant contended that his constitutional right to
the presence of counsel was violated during trial when the court
proceeded with the direct examination of a state witness in the
absence of defense counsel. The court held that proceeding with
the direct examination of a witness, in the absence of defense
counsel, may not be considered harmless error under either the
federal1 0 17 or state 10 1 8 constitutions. 1019

1015. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). "An accused . . .
having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not

subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made
available to him, unless the accused himself initiatesfurther communication,
exchanges, or conversationswith the police." Id. at 484-85 (emphasis added).
1016. 157 A.D.2d 64, 554 N.Y.S.2d 676 (2d Dep't 1990).
1017. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

1018. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
1019. Margan, 157 A.D.2d at 69, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 679.
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At a jury trial, defendant was convicted of robbery in the first
degree and criminal prosecution of weaponry in the third degree.
During the trial, the judge directed the prosecutor to begin the direct examination of his first witness despite the fact that the de10 2 0
fendant's attorney was not yet present in the courtroom.
The appellate court reasoned that the denial of counsel "may
never be tolerated" 1021 and "deprivation of the assistance of
counsel during trial would be, if anything, more offensive to the
State than to the Federal Constitution." ' 1022 Additionally, the
court held that errors of this magnitude may be reserved for
"appellate review as a matter of law" 10 2 3 regardless of whether
timely objection was raised at trial. The trial court's judgment
was reversed and a new trial ordered. 1024
The court began its analysis by noting that both the federal and
state constitutions secure to an accused the right to the assistance
of counsel. 1025 The court distinguished between the right to the
presence of counsel and the right to the effective assistance of
counsel. This distinction is crucial because ineffective assistance
of counsel may, under many circumstances, be harmless error.
"[R]eversal is unwarranted unless defense counsel's ineptitude
actually had a probable effect on the outcome of the trial." 1026
1020. Id. at 65, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 676.

1021. Id. at 69, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 679.
1022. Id. New York State constitutional law generally affords the defendant
broader protections under the right to counsel than does the Federal

Constitution. See, e.g., People v. Krom, 61 N.Y.2d 187, 461 N.E.2d 276,
473 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1984); People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 348 N.E.2d
894, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1976). The court of appeals has discussed when it
may determine that the state constitution affords greater protection to an
individual than does the Federal Constitution. See People v. Vilardi, 76
N.Y.2d 67, 555 N.E.2d 915, 556 N.Y.S.2d 518 (1990); People v. P.J. Video,
Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 296, 501 N.E.2d 556, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907 (1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987).

1023. Margan, 157 A.D.2d at 69, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 679.
1024. Id. at 71, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 680.

1025. Id. at 65, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 677 (citing U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV;
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6; Gideon v. Wainwright, 377 U.S. 335 (1963); Pointer
v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (federal guarantee of the right to counsel
obligatory on states pursuant to the fourteenth amendment)).
1026. Id. at 66, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 677.
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However, when the defendant is denied counsel, prejudice is
presumed. "Whe complete denial of counsel is an error so fundamental as to be harmful per se." 1 0 2 7 This right to the presence
of counsel at trial is almost as important as the right to a trial itself, because without the presence of counsel, the right to be
heard may be meaningless. 10 28
The court then proceeded to evaluate applicable state and federal law. Under New York law, the court discussed four court of
appeals cases. The first, People v. Hodge, 1029 applied the federal
rule of Coleman v. Alabama,1030 which held that "a preliminary
hearing was a 'critical' stage in a criminal prosecution [and] trigger[ed] the applicability of the Federal right to counsel.", 10 3 1 The
court required the reversal of a criminal conviction because the
defendant had been denied assistance of counsel during a
preliminary hearing. The reversal was deemed necessary,
regardless of the fact that defendant was later indicted by a grand
jury. 1032
The second case, People v. Wicks,1 033 clarified the holding of
Hodge by explaining that the absence of counsel at a preliminary
hearing does not require an automatic reversal and is subject to
harmless error analysis. However, the court did state that "the
defendant's right to counsel at trial was 'too fundamental' to
1034
permit application of the harmless error doctrine."
The third case cited was People v. Felder,1035 where the court
stated its belief that the right to counsel cannot be considered
1027. Id.
1028. Id. at 65, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 677 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45 (1932)).
1029. 53 N.Y.2d 313, 423 N.E.2d 1060, 441 N.Y.S.2d 231 (1981).

1030. 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
1031. Margan, 157 A.D. at 67, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 678 (citing Coleman v.
Alabama 399 U.S. 1, 10 (1970)).
1032. Id. (citing People v. Hodge, 53 N.Y.2d 313, 423 N.E.2d 1060, 441
N.Y.S.2d 231 (1981)).
1033. 76 N.Y.2d 128, 556 N.E.2d 409, 556 N.Y.S.2d 970 (1990).
1034. Margan, 157 A.D.2d at 67, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 678 (citing People v.
Wicks, 76 N.Y.2d 128, 132, 556 N.E.2d 409, 411, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 970, 972
(1990)).
1035. 47 N.Y.2d 287, 391 N.E.2d 1274, 418 N.Y.S.2d 295 (1979).
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harmless error. 10 36 In Felder, reversal was required because the

defendant had been represented by someone who "claimed to be
an attorney but who had neither completed law school nor been
admitted to the bar." 1037
In the last case, People v. Hilliard,10 38 the court reversed a
criminal conviction, even in the absence of prejudice, because a
local arraignment court had ordered defense counsel not to
communicate with the defendant for thirty days. The court
reversed the conviction, even though the defendant was
39
eventually represented by counsel at his trial. 10
The court in Margan, relying on the strong precedent set in the
cases discussed above, ordered a reversal even though it concluded that the brief absence of counsel was "unlikely to have affected the outcome of the trial." 1040 Further, the court believed
that this ruling was required regardless of whether or not the tardiness of defense counsel at trial was wilful. 1041
In its second holding, that appellate review was appropriate as
a matter of law despite the lack of objection at trial, the court
distinguished the facts of this case from the decision reached in
People v. Narayan.1042 In Narayan, the court of appeals denied
review to a defendant on his appeal because his defense attorney
did not object at trial. The appeal was denied even though the appeal involved the trial judge's refusal to allow defendant an opportunity to speak with his attorney during court recesses.
Although the trial judge's rulings might have been erroneous,
they did not involve "the absence of counsel at the critical
time" 10 43 and, hence, the lack of objection was seen as
acquiescence. In contrast, the errors committed against the
defendant in Margan were made in the total absence of counsel,
1036.
1037.
1038.
1039.
1040.
1041.
counsel
1042.
1043.

Id. at 295, 391 N.E.2d at 1277, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 299.
Margan, 157 A.D.2d at 67, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 678.
73 N.Y.2d 584, 540 N.E.2d 702, 542 N.Y.S.2d 507 (1989).
Id. at 586-87, 540 N.E.2d at 702-03, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 507-08.
Margan, 157 A.D.2d at 68, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 678.
Id. at 71, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 680. In the present case, the defense
had an adequate explanation for his delay. Id.
54 N.Y.2d 106, 429 N.E.2d 123, 444 N.Y.S.2d 604 (1981).
Id. at 113, 429 N.E.2d at 125, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 606.
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leaving him no opportunity to cure the errors and their resulting
prejudice. 104 4 Thus, reversal and review fell under the general
rule permitting a violation of the right to counsel to be raised for
the first time on appeal as a matter of law.
The court also cited several federal cases that support its decision. Under the Federal Constitution, Gideon v. Wainwright104 5
established the right for an accused to have the assistance of
counsel. 1 46 In Hamilton v. Alabama,10 4 7 the United States
Supreme Court held that denial of counsel to a defendant at his
arraignment constituted automatic reversible error, regardless of
the prejudicial effect of that error. 10 48 The Margan court
reasoned that if counsel is required at arraignment, presence of
counsel at the trial itself should be more carefully protected.
Similarly, in United States v. Cronic,10 49 the Court stated that
the complete denial of counsel is so likely to prejudice the
accused, that litigating the case is unjustified. 10 50 Finally, the
court relied on Green v. Arn105 1 for its similarity to the facts of
Margan. In Green, the defense attorney was voluntarily absent
from portions of one afternoon of the trial during which time his
co-defendant's counsel was cross-examining one of the state's
witnesses. The court found that this brief absence required a
presumption of prejudice and automatic reversal. 10 52 The
Margan court reasoned that the facts in the present case, where
counsel was involuntarily delayed and the state had begun
directly examining its own witness, necessitated reversal
regardless of prejudice. 1053
1044. Margan, 157 A.D.2d at 70, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 680.
1045. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
1046. Id. at 344.
1047. 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
1048. Id. at 55.
1049. 466 U.S. 648 (1984). The court stated that it had "uniformly found
constitutional error without any showing of prejudice when counsel was either
totally absent, or prevented from assisting the accused during a critical stage of
the proceeding." Id. at 659 n.25.
1050. Id. at 658-59.
1051. 809 F.2d 1257 (6th Cir.), vacated, 484 U.S. 806 (1987).
1052. Id. at 1263.
1053. Margan, 157 A.D.2d at 71, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 680.
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